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1. Introduction 
On September 13, 2007, the United Nations’ General Assembly adopted the 
“Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,” a document that was created to support the 
protection of native people around the world and encourage them to participate in decision-making. 
Although the document is not legally binding to any country, it can be considered to be a significant 
milestone in indigenous people’s fight for their legal rights. Nonetheless, are today’s native groups 
able to mobilize and demand their rights through politics? Two particularly interesting cases of 
indigenous politics are Peru and Bolivia. Although both of these Andean countries have large 
indigenous populations, they are at opposite poles when it comes to the political mobilization of 
native groups. Whereas the legislation and ethnicity-based political identities in Bolivia have 
allowed the country’s indigenous people to organize themselves in an unprecedented fashion, there 
continues to be a lack of political mobilization of native groups in Peru. More specifically, the 
class-based political identities and the country’s governance have contributed to the fact that 
political mobilization of the Peruvian indigenous people remains uncommon, and when native 
groups do assemble, they lack legal recognition.  
This paper will, therefore, compare current trends in the mobilization of indigenous 
people in Peru and Bolivia. To begin with, I will take a look at how the oppressed social role of 
native people in Latin America dates back to colonial times. This historical background is 
fundamental to fully understanding why indigenous people’s participation in political processes is 
necessary throughout the continent. Secondly, this paper will compare the current legislation in 
Peru and Bolivia regarding the countries’ vast indigenous populations and their rights. Furthermore, 
through appropriate examples, this paper will closely examine recent developments in the 
mobilization of native groups in both of these Andean countries. Finally, the latter section of this 
paper will explore some of the sociocultural forces that play a role in Bolivian and Peruvian 
indigenous people’s collective participation in politics.  
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2. History of Indigenous People in Latin America 
The year of Christopher Columbus’ supposed discovery of the Americas, 1492, is 
often referred to as a watershed moment in the history of Latin America. In fact, Columbus Day is 
celebrated around the world in order to commemorate the maritime explorer’s arrival in the 
Caribbean on October 12, 1942. What is often forgotten in the appraisals of Columbus, however, is 
that his voyages marked the beginning of an elitist colonial system that, while no longer in force, 
continues to influence and structure contemporary politics in Latin America. The European 
colonization of the Americas, in other words, inaugurated a long history of oppression of the native 
populations of Central and South America. Consequently, before analyzing contemporary 
indigenous groups and their political mobilization, it is vital to understand the severity of the 
conventional, ethnicity-based, and repressive makeup of Latin societies. This section of the paper 
will, therefore, present the historical conditions of indigenous groups in Latin America.  
 Before Columbus arrived in the Americas, the native people, who had begun 
inhabiting the continent as early as 40,000 years ago, had formed three major indigenous 
populations. Although numerous smaller native groupings existed, the chief civilizations in the pre-
conquest era were those of the Aztecs, Mayans, and the Incas. While the first two were concentrated 
in the region that is now the Mexican state and Central America, the Incan empire blossomed in 
present-day Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. In total, there were an “upward of 70 million people living 
in the Americas when the Europeans arrived” (Vanden & Provost 2006, 19 & 83). 
In the early sixteenth century, the Spanish conquistadors that arrived in the Americas 
not only almost completely exterminated the native populations, but they also established a new, 
repressive social structure in Latin America. The Spaniards came to the new world in search of 
riches; they viewed the colonies as a way to extract resources, such as gold and diamonds. In fact, 
the conquistadors had legal permission from the Spanish monarchy to exploit and steal the native 
peoples’s possessions. “The only requirement was,” as Valen and Provost note, “that they pay the 
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royal fifth, or quinto real” (28). In other words, as long as the conquerors were loyal to the crown 
and paid taxes, they had free hands to gather as much fortune as possible – at the expense of 
indigenous people, of course. “The native peoples were often completely brutalized in the 
plundering of their societies and were at best seen by most as instruments of lucre and occasionally 
lust: slaves to capture and sell, laborers to exploit, owners of land or property to be seized, women 
to be used,” point out Valen and Provost (28-29). This oppression of the indigenous populations 
materialized in the creation of a system of social classification that determined people’s social status 
or casta according to their descent and skin colour. Whereas white Spaniards and their offspring 
were at the top of the social pyramid, darker-skinned natives and African slaves constituted the 
lower and most oppressed social classes. 
This colonial discrimination against the indigenous people did not come to an end 
when the Spanish crown lost its rule in South America. Although most Latin American countries 
gained their independence in the early 1820s, the colonial system of social classification continued 
to oppress the lower classes that mainly consisted of natives. “The local elites succeeded in 
transferring political power into their own hands,” write Valen and Provost, “and the underlying 
systems of social and economic power inherited from the colonial era remained largely intact” (42). 
More specifically, the colonial tradition of authoritarian rule, which explicitly discriminated against 
the natives, prolonged in Latin America despite the countries’ separation from the Spanish rule. It is 
important to keep in mind this notion of historical discrimination against the indigenous peoples in 
order to fully comprehend the ground-breaking nature of contemporary political mobilizations of 
Central and South American native groups.  
3. Political Mobilization of Indigenous Groups 
3.1 Legislation 
When analyzing the political mobilization of indigenous groups in Bolivia and Peru, it 
is important that we first take a look at the countries’ legislation on the rights of native people. In 
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other words, we need to be able to understand the legal framework within which any political 
mobilization in these two Andean countries can lawfully take place. While Peru and Bolivia have 
both improved their legislation on native groups’ rights, the current Bolivian constitution is a world-
wide leader in terms of the extent to which it protects the country’s aboriginal groups. Thus, this 
section will examine the laws regarding the political rights of the indigenous people in Peru and 
Bolivia. 
 Overall, both countries have come a long way from colonial times with regards to the 
rights of indigenous peoples. First and foremost, unlike during the colonial rule and the 
authoritarian regimes that followed the collapse of the Spanish viceroyalties in Latin America, 
today’s native people of Peru and Bolivia have the right to vote in public elections. Whereas 
universal suffrage was enacted in Bolivia in 1952 (as a result of the Bolivian Revolution), the entire 
Peruvian population did not get to vote until the country returned to democracy 1980.  
 Moreover, both countries are signatories to the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) Convention 169. This convention, also known as the “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention,” was first ratified by Bolivia in 1991 and, two years later, by Peru (Wessendorf 157 & 
170). The convention, adopted by the ILO’s general conference on June 27, 1989, called attention 
to “the distinctive contributions of indigenous and tribal peoples to the cultural diversity and social 
and ecological harmony of humankind and to international co-operation and understanding” (ILO, 
1989). Furthermore, in addition to stating that indigenous people should, among other rights, be 
entitled to acquire education, the ILO Convention 169 emphasized native groups’ right to mobilize 
politically. According to the document, governments have the responsibility “to establish means by 
which these [indigenous] peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors 
of the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and 
other bodies responsible for policies and programmes which concern them” (ILO, 1989). 
Nonetheless, an important distinction to make in terms of the actual enforcement of the Convention 
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169 is that whereas the rights the convention grants to indigenous people are currently recognized in 
the Bolivian constitution, the Peruvian native groups have never been accorded such official 
acknowledgment (Wessendorf 157).  
 Similarly, Bolivia and Peru differ in their legal recognition of the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Although the declaration negations 
lasted over two decades, they finally came to an end when the UNDRIP was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on September 13, 2007. The most fundamental and previously unrecognized 
right that UNDRIP addressed was indigenous people’s right to self-determination and, therefore, 
political mobilization:  
By that right they can freely determine their political status and pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development. They have the right to maintain and 
strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, 
while retaining their rights to participate fully, if they choose to, in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of the state. (Articles 3-5)  
 
Ironically, even though Luis-Enrique Chávez of Peru was the Chairman of UNDRIP’s Working 
Group during the negotiations, only Bolivia has extended its constitution to include the declaration 
in its entirety. In fact, as Wessendorf points out, “on 7 November 2007, through Law No. 3760, it 
[Bolivia] became the first country in the world to ratify the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples” (170).  
 In general, the current Bolivian constitution, which was passed after a referendum on 
January, 25, 2009, is unprecedented in terms of the recognition it gives to the rights of indigenous 
people. It recognizes the existence of native Bolivians prior to the Spanish conquest and gives them 
the right to practice their own traditions, cultures, and norms. Unlike that of Peru, the Bolivian 
constitution gives thirty-three indigenous languages equal standing with Spanish (in Peru, native 
languages are considered official only in areas where they predominate). Moreover, the constitution 
defines the Bolivian state as a “community” (Georgetown University, 2009). This notion is 
particularly interesting because it allows three different types of democratic participation to be 
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officially recognized. In addition to participatory and representative democracy, the Bolivian 
constitution acknowledges community democracy, as Wessendorf notes, “by means of election, 
appointment or direct nomination of representatives according to local custom” (177). The current 
Bolivian constitution even acknowledges traditional customs of the country’s vast and diverse 
native groups. In Article 8, the constitution states that the Bolivian state assumes and promotes 
multiple indigenous values and principles, like ama suwa (transl. “don’t be weak, don’t be a liar, 
and don’t be a thief”), suma qamaña (transl. “live well”), and ñandereko (transl. “harmonious life”) 
(Georgetown University, 2009). 
 To sum, while Peruvian and Bolivian indigenous groups have both gained some major 
legal rights they did not have during the colonial rule, such as universal suffrage and the right to 
participate in decision-making, the Bolivian constitution goes a lot further in protecting the 
country’s native groups’ rights. 
3.2. Native Groups’ Mobilization in Bolivia 
On Sunday, December 6, 2009, Bolivia’s first president of native origin, Evo Morales, 
was elected to his second term. “This is the return of the Pachakuti for us, the indigenous majority 
of this country,” commented Eugenio Rojas on Morales’ re-election in an interview with The New 
York Times, making reference to the fifteenth century Inca emperor and revolutionist Pachacuti Inca 
Yupanqui (Romero A8). Indeed, the political mobilization of indigenous groups in Bolivia over the 
past two decades has been, if not revolutionary, at least unparalleled in modern political history. 
Accordingly, this section will take a look at recent trends in the political mobilization of native 
groups in Bolivia. 
The year that most academics consider to be the most crucial in the history of political 
mobilization of indigenous groups in Bolivia is 1990. That year, over 700 indigenous men and 
women walked from the country’s lowlands to La Paz in order to demonstrate against the “500 
Years Celebration” that would be held two years later in commemoration of the anniversary of 
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Columbus’ discovery of the new world in 1492. “By the time they [the demonstrators] arrived, el 
movimiento was born,” Goodale notes, “and in the process Bolivian indigenousness had been recast 
within a wider universe…and the 500 Years of Celebration had given way to 500 Years of 
Resistance” (636). In other words, the 1990 march symbolized the beginning of a pluralistic 
indigenous movement in Bolivia that embraces the country’s diverse native groups.  
Three years after the watershed rally of 1990, a self-identified indigenous Bolivian 
was elected to a high political office for the first time, when Víctor Hugo Cárdenas Conde became 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s vice president. More importantly, however, Sánchez de Lozada or 
“Goni,” as Bolivians refer to him, enforced progressive social and legal reforms, such as bilingual 
education and “the implementation at the national legal level of different international human rights 
norms, especially those involving the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples” (Goodale 637).   
Nonetheless, the neoliberal economic policies of privatization and deregulation, 
promoted by Goni and his successor, Hugo Banzer Suárez, led to another milestone in the political 
mobilization of Bolivian indigenous groups: the Cochabamba Water War of 1999-2000. Pushed by 
the World Bank, Banzer decided to privatize the government agency in charge of water services in 
the Cochabamba Valley, the Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable de Cochabamba or SEMAPA, 
and sell the concessions to Aguas de Tunari, a subsidiary of the U.S.-based multinational Bechtel 
Corporation. “Once the water services had been privatized, prices rose dramatically within a very 
short period and social unrest soon followed,” states Goodale (637). The protests, led by indigenous 
Oscar Olivera, were attended by large groups of native people carrying the wiphala flag, a 
prominent symbol of the Andean indigenous tribes. Finally, due to the vast demonstrations “in 
which one youth was killed and dozens injured by soldiers,” as Goodale reports, “the Banzer 
government was forced to cancel its contract with Bechtel in April 200” (637). In other words, a 
decade after the march of 1990, the Bolivian indigenous groups were able to assemble successfully 
and reject an unfavorable government policy.  
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In particular, the Water War of late 1999 and early 2000 was a turning point for Evo 
Morales and, thus, for the entire process of political mobilization of Bolivian indigenous groups. 
Together with his political party, Movimiento al Socialismo (transl. “Movement for Socialism”) or 
the MAS, then-congressman Morales joined the Cochabamba protests. Native groups and union 
workers advocating against the government’s neoliberal policies found it easy to relate to an 
indigenous cocalero (a supporter of coca production) that was promoting a bottom-up approach to 
Bolivian politics. Encouraged by the vast support, Morales run for presidency in the 2002 elections 
and, to the surprise of traditional right-wing parties, he came in second place. Although Morales did 
not win, the Movement for Socialism became, for the first time in its history, the second largest in 
both houses of the Bolivian Congress (Singer & Morrison 180).   
Morales’ victorious moment came on December 18, 2005, when he won the 
presidential elections with an absolute majority. Moreover, MAS made history by becoming the 
largest party in the Congress with seventy-two deputies and twelve senators (CNE 2006). On the 
day of the elections, Morales described himself as the “candidate of those despised in Bolivian 
history, the candidate of the most disdained, discriminated against” (BBC News 2005). His 
statement depicts the great significance of the 2005 elections; for the first time in Bolivia’s history, 
the indigenous majority had been able to successfully mobilize and gain absolute political power. 
Furthermore, as the most recent statistics from the December 6, 2009 elections show, Morales and 
MAS seem to be only increasing their popularity. As a supporter of Morales symbolically 
comments on the elections, “This revolution, this process of change, is unstoppable” (Romero A8).   
Indeed, the political mobilization of Bolivian indigenous groups seems to be 
relentless. As the Movement for Socialism continues to become more and more popular, other 
indigenous political parties are being established. The second largest indigenous political party in 
Bolivia, the Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti (transl. “the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement”) or the 
MIP, has already participated in three consecutive presidential and legislative elections (2002, 2005, 
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and 2009).  Although the party received only around two percent of the popular vote in 2002 and 
2005, it managed to win six seats in the Chamber of Deputies in 2002 (Singer & Morrison 180). 
Another example of the increasing political mobilization of Bolivian native groups is the 
Movimiento Originario Popular or the MOP, a small social and political party active in Bolivia’s 
norte de Potosí region. “Despite the fact that MOP is not nearly as well-established as MIP – either 
nationally, or within its home region – it has managed to fundamentally shift relations of power in 
the norte de Potosí,” emphasizes Goodale (638). In other words, while other indigenous political 
parties might still lack the executive power of the Movement for Socialism, native groups around 
Bolivia are more and more politically mobilized.  
3.3. Native Groups’ Mobilization in Peru 
 On February 23, 2007, the Alan García government of Peru decided to bring the 
Institutio Nacional de Desarollo de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuano or INDEPA 
(transl. “the National Institute for the Development of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian 
Peoples”) to an end and shrink it to a Native Peoples’ Department within the country’s Ministry of 
Women and Social Development (MIMDES). “With this measure,” Wessendorf noted on the 
severity of the verdict: “The government took a seven-year step backwards in terms of public 
institutionality on indigenous peoples given that, from being an autonomous ministerial-level 
decentralized public body . . . it has gone back to being hierarchically and functionally much lesser 
body” (158). Although the Congress passed a law cancelling the executive decree in December of 
2007, García’s initial decision depicts the current Peruvian administrators’ unwillingness to act 
upon the ILO Convention 169 or the UNDRIP and listen to the demands of indigenous groups. This 
section of my paper will, therefore, not only take a look at the overall lack of indigenous political 
mobilization in Peru, but it will also examine how the Peruvian government continues to neglect 
any demands put forward by the country’s native groups that are not often politically organized. 
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 Unlike the Movement for Socialism and the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement in 
Bolivia, there are no Peruvian political parties that are highly affiliated with indigenous groups. The 
most prominent example used to support the existence of indigenous politics in Peru is the Partido 
Nacionalista Peruano (transl. “The Peruvian Nationalist Party”) and, more importantly, its founder 
Ollanta Humala. In 2006, Humala ran for presidency and came in second place, right after García. 
Nonetheless, although Humala is, indeed, of native descent and his father and brother are 
ideological leaders in the Peruvian indigenous movement called the etnocacerismo, he has 
explicitly taken distance to his relatives and campaigned on the premises of the left-wing 
Nationalist Party. In other words, while Humala does advocate for many indigenous rights, such as 
the legal protection of native languages of Quechua and Aymara, paralleling his Nationalist Party 
with Morales’ MAS would be far-fetched.  
 Furthermore, any other attempts of the Peruvian native groups to mobilize politically 
have been either subjugated or neglected by the country’s ruling regime. This was the case, for 
instance, when the indigenous groups in the farming communities of Yanta and Secunda y Cajas 
tried to mobilize against Monterrico Metals’ (a London-based mining company) operations in the 
region in 2007. “The municipalities of Ayabaca, Pacaipamba and Carmen de la Frontera organized 
a local consultation on 16 September to ascertain the local people’s opinion with regard to mining 
activity,” Wessendorf points out on the legal mobilization process (163). The members of the 
consultation process voted on the Monterrico Metals’ Majaz Mining Project and a striking 94.54 
percent objected the company’s operations (Wessendorf 164). Notwithstanding the peaceful and 
legitimate civic participation, the Peruvian government embarked, in the words of Wessendorf, “on 
an aggressive and intolerant campaign in opposition to the consultation” (163). The measures the 
García administration is willing to take to silence any indigenous mobilizations are vast, corrupted, 
and diverse. In the case of the Majaz Mining Project, for instance, the “Prime Minister Jorge del 
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Castillo even threatened the council authorities and the broadcaster Radio Cutivalú for refusing to 
distribute a message that carried misleading information” ( Wessendorf 164).  
 The increasing emphasis the García regime puts on neoliberal policies has forced 
Peruvian native groups to mobilize in order to protect their rights. By auctioning oil and gas 
concessions to the country’s Amazon region, the government attempts to attract as much of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) as possible. The year 2007 was unprecedentedly good for Peru in terms of 
FDI received: “The State ended the year with a record 24 hydrocarbon exploration contracts, 
surpassing the 16 contracts in 2006 and 15 in 2005” (Wessendorf 164). Nevertheless, like with 
mining projects, the Peruvian government has continued to ignore the ILO 169 and UNDRIP 
principles of including local native groups in the decision-making processes. In June 2009, the lack 
of official recognition given to the indigenous peoples’ attempts to express their opinions regarding 
the oil and gas concession to the Peruvian Amazon escalated into the deathliest political crisis in 
Peru since the 1980s guerilla wars of the Shining Path. The indigenous protestors, led by the 
National Organization of the Amazon Indigenous People of Peru (Asociación Inter-étnica por el 
Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana or AIDESEP), roadblocked a stretch of highway in the Peruvian 
Amazon known as the "Devil's Curve." President Garcia, who has stated that “everyone should 
benefit from the country's natural resources not just the people who happened to live in the areas 
concerned,” ordered the Peruvian military to break up the roadblock (BBC News 2009). At least 
nine policemen and twenty-one tribesmen were killed in the clashes between the protestors and 
security forces.  
 Although the events of June 2009, were another example of how the Peruvian 
government disrespects any mobilization of native people, the Amazonians’ protests were at least 
partly successful. On June 18, the Peruvian Congress overturned two of the fundamental decrees 
that had initiated the protests at the Devil’s Curve. In response to the Congress’ decision, the leader 
of AIDESEP, Daysi Zapata, stated enthusiastically, “Today is a historic day for all indigenous 
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people and for the nation of Peru” (Zarate A13). By overturning the two decrees, the Peruvian 
Congress did, indeed, take into account the native groups’ right to be involved in the decision-
making process. Nonetheless, it should be noted that, despite the Congress’ verdict, President 
García is yet to meet with AIDESEP in formal negotiations.  
3.4. Cultural Factors  
In addition to the differences in legislation as well as the current governments’ 
policies on and reactions to the mobilization of indigenous groups, Bolivia and Peru are dissimilar 
in their people’s sociopolitical identities. Whereas Bolivian politics are founded on collective 
identities of indigenous cosmopolitanism, class-based identities prevail in Peru. Accordingly, this 
section of the paper will explore how these distinct political sociopolitical identities influence the 
mobilization of native groups.  
Over the past two decades, there has been an increased discourse of multiculturalism 
in the Bolivian society that has allowed the countries’ native groups to mobilize politically. This 
new sociopolitical atmosphere is most vividly expressed in the lyrics of Wayna Tambo rappers. 
Through their music, the members of the flourishing El Alto rap movement envision a new type of 
sociopolitical citizenship or a new framework of belonging in which Bolivia’s repressed and 
marginalized are brought together. “By refusing to accede to all of the traditional categories of 
Bolivian identity (campesino, Indian, Aymara, Quechua, runa, q’ara),” Goodale writes, “the 
rappers of Wayna Tambo are part of a second revolution in Bolivia...this second Bolivian revolution 
is essentially discursive” (635). The discussions have taken a more cosmopolitan approach to the 
discrimination against minority groups; in fact, the rappers often refer to other oppressed groups, 
such as the North African Muslims during the Parisian civil unrest of October and November 2005.  
Although the Wayna Tambo rappers might be the most explicit example of how 
indigenousness is embraced in today’s Bolivia, an entire new cultural identity, indigenous 
cosmopolitanism, has become dominant. Since the 1990s, sociopolitical issues in Bolivia have been 
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reinterpreted, as Goodale puts it, “through a much different, cosmopolitan, discourse, one that is 
anchored in an indigenous imaginary that is both empowering and utopian” (643). It is no 
coincidence, therefore, that the over 700 indigenous men and women who marched from Bolivia’s 
lowlands to La Paz in the 1990 marches carried wiphala flags with them. The rainbow-colored flag 
has been the symbol of indigenousness since the ancient times, but since the 1990s, the wiphala has 
also come to “express an emergent indigenous cosmopolitanism, which brings together Bolivia’s 
different originarios, or ‘original ones,’ with all of the ‘First Nations’ of the Americas” (Goodale 
636).  
Unlike in Bolivia where the newly defined indigenous cosmopolitanism has given 
native activists the ability to “bring together apparently disparate discursive of belonging…and the 
meanings of modernity itself,” the class-based identities of Peruvian politics make it hard for the 
country’s indigenous groups to mobilize politically (Goodale 634). In order to participate in 
decision-making, Peruvian native people are forced to give up some of their cultural traditions and 
identify according to their socioeconomic class rather than their ethnicity. The famous Peruvian 
author, Mario Vargas Llosa, recognized the indigenous people’s need to assimilate in the dominant 
culture: “Indian peasants live in such a primitive way that communication is practically impossible. 
It is only when they move to the cities that they have the opportunity to mingle with the other Peru. 
The price they must pay for integration is high – renunciation of their culture, their language, their 
belief, their traditions and customs...After one generation they become mestizos, and they are not 
longer Indians” (Paredes 22). Indeed, the Peruvian sociopolitical culture and its discrimination 
against indigenous people force native groups to emphasize subsistence over preserving their 
culture. This social phenomenon has gone so far that some Peruvian indigenous people do not even 
want their children to attend bilingual schools; they acknowledge that by maintaining their native 
cultural habits, indigenous children will continue to be discriminated against. “If Quechua were 
privileged, the situation might be different, and we might even want our children to read and write 
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in our language,” noted an indigenous father, “But until that happens, our strategy for the 
improvement of our children’s education is still determined by our reality” (Paredes 23-24). 
To sum, the native groups of Peru are forced to politically organize themselves 
according to their socioeconomic status (as opposed to their cultural identity), whereas an entirely 
new native identity, indigenous cosmopolitanism, has become dominant in the Bolivian society. 
4. Conclusion 
The Bolivian native groups, on one hand, have been able to not only politically 
mobilize in a magnitude that is unprecedented in the world but also transform the sociopolitical 
culture of Bolivia into one of indigenous cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, the current Peruvian 
government continues to neglect the country’s vast native population in its decision-making, which 
has led to a sociopolitical atmosphere in which the political mobilization of native Peruvians is rare. 
It is interesting to see, however, what the recently re-elected President of Bolivia, Evo Morales, will 
do in the future. Will he continue granting the Bolivian native groups more privileges, and will he 
seek to prolong his tenure indefinitely like Hugo Chávez of Venezuela? At the same time, the next 
Peruvian general elections in 2011 will show if the aggressive neoliberal policies promoted by 
García will have a similar effect to that of the Cochabamba Water War. Will Ollanta Humala or 
another candidate be encouraged by the relative success of the Amazonian protests in June, 2009, 
and campaign on an anti-U.S. and pro-indigenous premises? Although Humala or another native 
leader did win the elections, it should be acknowledged that it takes more for sociocultural change 
to take place than just political elections. In other words, the future Peruvian governments need to 
make preserving the country’s diverse native groups’ cultures a priority; only vast social programs 
will allow Peruvian indigenous people to be proud of and embrace their native identity. 
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